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IS THERE SUCH A THING AS JUDICIAL LEGISLATION?
-------------
Is there such a. thing as judge made law ? Were
this question to be discussed from the theoretical
standpoint alone,a negative answer would be the only one
admissible. That there should be no such thing was
affirmed by many of the greatest of England' s judges
long before America had been thought of; and since its
discoverythat same view has been held to more or less
strenuously by the conservative members of the judiciary
both in England and America.
The courts in referring to the question of judicial
legislation use such expressions as; "We believe that
the certainty, the stability and the syiimetry of any
system of jurisprudence should be preserved," "we be-
lieve in a rigid adherence to the doctrine of stare
decisis. "  Lord Mansfield says ; 'it is not my duty
to make the law,but by my industiyI I can find out what
the law has been in the past and thus declare it for
the future."
The rule has been to adhere to precedent and to
leave it to the legislature to lay down new lines to be
followed as necessity requires. However true to theory
this proposition may be,it is certainly far from what
actually exists. In their anxiety however,to refrain
from eating the forbidden fruitwhich theoretically
is fit food for the legislature alone but which in the
nature of things they must partake of in generous quan-
tities,the judges in their dire extremityhave resorted
to legal fictionin order to keep up a show of consis-
tency. They declare that a court has a right to judge
as to whether a question has been formerly considered ani
deterniined with due deliberation;also, that 'due delibera-
tion is the test as to whether it is good or bad lawand
if bad lawit iS they sayno law at all! It will be
seen that by the aid of the above propositionsany ob-
jectional decision may be over-ruled by any court if it
appears to its judges to be bad law and therefore not
settled with due deliberationand consequentlyno law at
Butler vs.Van Wyck 1 Hill 438.
all- With the bitter pill thus sugared over with
legal sophistryit is,whenever circumstances require,
swallowed with due judicial dignity. In Peo.vs.
Brooklyn 9 Barb..544 overruling Wright vs.Wright the court
said:- "We look into these opinions in vain for the evi-
dence of that solemn argument,and mature deliberation
which upon the doctrine of stare decisis should grive
this case the weight of authority sufficient to fore-
close the judgment of all other tribunals upon the same
question." While the doctrine overruled in that case
was one backed up by a long line of cases. Againin
Bentley vs.Goodwin 38 Barb.640,the same court used the
following language in regard to a decision overruled by
that case. "If the decision was clearly erroneous so
as to leave no doubt as to the erroror the result of
mistake,the doctrine (stare decisis) need not be adhered
to,for the decision was probably a departure from the
spirit of the doctrine in the first instance,and there-
fore it is not violated by declaring the true position
in a later case" i.e. bad law is no law.
As a result of this painfully hairsplitting reas-
oning many of our judges both formerly and at present
have hoodwinked themselves into believingythat all
decisions handed down by them have had this legal anomo-
ly,"judicial legislation. "effectually strained out,by
forcirng them through the filtering apparatus of the
above mentioned propositions. Likewisethat great body
of lawthat has been growing up into a beautiful and
symmetrical structure for so many years about the Court
of Equity in England and America,representing in
crystalized form the righteousness,pure and simple,of
its many judgeshas been,as some think,purified of the
heresy by a similar chain of fictional reasoning.
Mr.Wooddeson assertsthat "Equity is a judicial inter-
pretation of laws,which presupposing the legislator to
have intended what is just and right,pursues and
effectuates that intention."
This explanation of the origin of Equity reminds
one forcibly of the Biblical legend of Adam and Eve in
the garden of Eden as explaining the origin of the human
race. The mere reading over of this legend has dispell-
I Vooddeson Lect.VII p.192.
5ed effectually the disagreeable image of a monkey ances-
tor from the minds of millions of the credulous,and sub-
stituted thereforthe more pleasant spectacle of a per-
fect man whose degenerate off-spring we are supposed to
be. If this latter conclusion has been a fountain
from which many have drunk self-respect and contentment,
well and good. May it still continue to sparkle though
it be unscientific. And if the above explanation of
the origin of Equity has in the past eased the conscience
or rendered the load of responsibility lighter for our
Chancery tribunals,I should be the last one to aid in
taking it away.
But there is another phase of the question to be
presented which has not to do with pedantic fictions,
but which presents things as they are,and which can leave
no doubt as to the existence of judge made law. The
fact that many great judges have overruled on further
reflection decisions by themselves made, is in itself
adequate proof of its existence. Whether this has been
done openly or whiether it is sought to hide the fact
benird carefully thought-out legal fictions,it makes no
difference as to the real result. The result is ac-
complished . Judicial legislation has existed in the
past to a larger degree than any other. Like the poor
it will always be with us and the greater a judge is the
more frequently will he exercise that function. History
will bear us out in this assertion. Lord Mansfield)
conservative as he was,has at least on twenty occasions
changed an opinion positively given. This might have
been done under the theory that "bad law is no law' and
thereforethe doctrine of stare decisis was not violated
in returning to the true principle~but nevertheless,it
was doneand brushing away the cobwebs of sophistry,
we behold here twenty distinct cases of judicial legisla-
tion and many more might be attributed to him. We
find many instances where Lord Hardwicke has done like-
wiseand the same is true of many other illustrious
characters. Indeed the greatest abilities are gene-
rally accompanied with the greatest candor and a desire
uninfluenced by any former conviction or prejudice,to do
the right and the equitable when circumstances by any
possioilitypermit it. There are instances it is true
especially in the law relating to real propertywhere the
rule of stare decisis should be strictly applied to all
cases therein arising; but this in no way effects tnat
which should be done as a general rule when the special
case is not up for decision. Sir Edward Coke,though a
great judge was a great legislator also and in making
adjudications he professed an earnest belief in the fol-
lowing maxim, uDeus optimus maximus sitientis jus et
justitian (ut credere cogor) intelligentiam aperit simil
et extendit" (Almighty God openeth and enlargeth the un-
derstanding of the desirous of justice and right). If
judicial legislation does not exist,what has become of
that regular and single system of the common law which
our English forefathers brought with them to the shores
of this continent ? Originally there was one system,
now the conmon law as declared in one state, conflicts
to a greater or less extent with that of every other
state. I think it will be admitted without further
illustrationrthat judicial legislation does in fact
exist.
9 Rep. (p.XXXVIII Lond. 1826)
II
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION IN ITS RELATION TO
STATUTE AND THE COMMON LAW .
My next point isthat judicial legislation has
bee-n more wide reaciiing in its results than that origi-
nating in the legislature proper. This may seem at
first,a sweeping and radical statementbut when one
thinks of the relative positions occupied by the legis-
lature and judiciary respectively with reference to
societyas composed of individuals,the position takenit
is submitted,is not an absurd one after all. The
legislature in the main,has to do with people as a
unit. From the highest legislative body in the land
down to the town board of supervisors this is true, and
this statement will hold true not only for America but
for England,France and Germany and any other countries
where the people in any sense govern and local self-
government prevails. Legislative enactments cannot
deal intimately with the individual so as to settle the
millions of difficulties and inequalities constantly
arising between man and man in practical life. The
legislature :ay construct the outline, the rude frame-
work of a system of laws,but it never can furnish the
multitudinous array of further materialnecessary to
convert that rude frame into a synnetrical and habitable
abode for civilized society. The judiciary alone can
furnish that material- Even the very foundation upon
which the legislature builds its part of the structure
has been provided it by equitable and legal principles
originating primarily with the courts. So without
hesitation I assert that judicial legislation furnishes
now and always will the principal element in our system
of law. Codification has never changed the character
of law. The mere fact that great compilations of the
existing law have been thrown together into code form
and passed by the legislature as statutes,does not in
any sense~ake such law a product of the legislature.
It still remains a product of the judiciary and the
legislature by adopting .it as its own,has given it noth-
ing,neither has it taken anything away.
We read a great deal in theoretical text-books on
Politics and Government about that Trinity which exists
in all free governments,the Executive the Legislative
and the Judiciary,as to how these departments should be
entirely distinct and each adhere strictly to its own
duties and limits. But in practice it must always be
otherwise. These duties are so internally connected,
so closely interwoven,so act and re-act upon each other,
that it is often difficultsometimes impossible to decide
where the jurisdiction of one department ends and that
of another begins. This is peculiarly true when we
approach to that broad common field lying between the
legislative and judicial departments. And this common
field is constantly growing broader and therefore draws
the line of demarcation between them less and less dis-
tinctly as time goes on. Perhaps the judiciary is
creating less and less of the rough frame workthe rude
skeleton of our system of laws,but at the same time, it
must,as it has ever beforefurnish the living tissue and
vitality which alone renders the system adequate and
effective in meeting the enormous demands made upon it
by our highly developed social,political and industrial
civilization.
For example,the law of corporations is composed,
governed and founded upon statute as much or more than
any other one branch of the law; yet if those parts
entering into it and which were contributed by judicial
legislationwere to be entirely eliminated from itwhat
would remain ? Obviously enough, simply dry bones and a
small heap at that. How imch would be left of the
statutory part of corporation law were we to prune away
all such principles as the coranon law doctrine in this
country,that the capital stock of a corporation is a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors; or that trans-
fers of property by a corporation in fraud of its credi-
tors vill be set aside and the property or its value be
recovered from the transferee-or in fact,all those
principles common to the conmdon-law institution known as
the joint-stock association and the corporation ?
About the only feature that distinguishes the corporation
from the joint-stock association is the statutory pro-
vision for limited liability,while all of the fundamen-
tal principles were given it by that great child of
judicial legislation known as the cornnron lawand out of
them disregarding the statutory element~we could easily
construct a :.achine which could be depended upon to per-
form almost precisely the same functions as tnose per-
formed by the corporation itself.
As regards Acts passed by the legislature,
judicial legislation comes in to modify and to re-en-
force principally in four ways: (1) by applying to them
the rules of statutory construction. Much law is
created in this way. For instance in one case a
statute may be pruned down and in other cases practically
construe out of existence by construction. A
good example of whichis the manner in which the old
Statute of Uses was smothered by the corauon law judges
and by equity tribunals; or (2) the judiciary may
decide that a certain statute is unconstitutional or
is not unconstitutional as the case may beand thus,
either destroy it altogether,or in order to save
itmay greatly modify its effect and in a large
measure athwart the interest of the legislature. (3) or
in construing any statute,the judges may impute a narrow
meaning to certain words used or a liberal meaning as
the case may be,and thus modify and mould the law to
their own notions of justice and the public good. To
illustrate this point take the Statute of Charitable
Uses passed during the reign of Elizabeth. This statute
contains a provision mentioning "the repair of churches."
By reason of this simple phrase existing in the statute
the courts have decreed, that everything devised,for a re-
ligious purposeis within the provisions pf the statute.
(4) A statute may be ignored altogether in some impor-
tant particulars and new law created by the judiciary,
for instance the case of Botsford vs.Krake 1 Abbotts
Pr. (N.S.)112,coming up under the statute regulating
wills in New York State. This case gives us an ex-
cellent example of where judicial legislation cazie in to
override a statute in order that justice .i git be done.
It is a fundamental rule of the law of wills that
statutes concerning them shall be construed strictly
and that the instrument itself left oy deceased persons
shall be construed liberally. In this way alone are
the courts able to get at the intent of the testator and
to successfully carry out such intent as to the disposal
of property left by him. In the Botsford vs.Krake Will
case we have an examaple of judicial legislation cutting
both ways like a two-edged swordjentirely overriding a
statute on the one hand and making a new addition to the
law of wills as to the State of New York on the other.
The facts in the case were substantially as follows:
The deceased,a volunteer from the State of New York in
the actual service of the United Sates was wounded in
the battle of the Weldon R.R.in Virginia August 18,1864
and died the same night. Previous to his deathin a
letter written to his sister,Jane Botsfordhe expressed
a desire and intention that in case of his death his
property should go to his sister the said Jane Botsford.
On the eve of his death it appears that the deceased
discussed with his attendants the subject of the disposi-
tion of his propertybut they refuse to swear that he
expressed a desire that his sister Jane should have it.
The judge deciding this case seems to decide it on prin-
ciples of abstract justice without regard to the statute
J~asiod'vs. rsk e 1 A 1- 0t, t's P , 7zS,) / ;,
existing regulating the subject of wills. The whole de-
cision is summed up in the last sentence where he says;
"that portion of the letter referring to his property
must be admitted to probate as a will." Here he drops
the whole case without further cormment and makes no at-
tempt to fortify this position takenby legal argument.
The New York Statute declares that "Every last will and
testament of real or personal property or bothshall be
executed and attested in the following manner." Then
follows the well known provisions regarding attesting
witnesses,the testators signature,acknowledgment &c.
One exception ayl but one is made to this rule. Section
22 Ch.VI Art.2 N.Y.R.S. says; "No nuncupative or unwrit-
ten willbequeathing personal estateshall be valid
unless made by a soldier while in actual military service
or by a marine while at sea." By the statutes of this
state it will be seen,that no written will is recog-
nized as good unless the requirements of the statute
are complied with; thereforeit follows that the letter
in this case is to be ruled out;and no nuncupative will
appears in the casefor the plaintiff completely failed
to prove the existence of such a will,as the attendants
were unwilling to swear that such a will was made by
the dying soldier. The letter itself,nevertheless,was
declared to be a will and the statute entirely ignored.
Turning from statutory law as a field for judicial
legislationit will be well to glance at soaie leading
cases where the judges have wrought marked changes in
the old and time honored rules of the common law itself.
In other wordswhere they have clanged or destroyed the
force of prior precedents by themselves made by making
alterations and new additions to the common law irrespec-
tive of forL.er decisions. I will take two recent and
sharply defined cases to illustrate my point. (a) The
recent case of judicial legislation originating in the
courts of the State of Wisconsin,which does away as to
that state.with a part of the force of the maxim,'omnis
ratihabitio et mandato priori Fequiporatur," in the law
of Agency. (b) The case of Seymour vs.Sturgis 26 N.Y.
134,which practically does away in New York, in many
situationswith the rule that "the capital stock of a
corporation is a trust fund for the benefit of creditors
CI) The rule in the lav of Agency,that t e suosequent
ratification by a principal of his agent's unauthorized
act,is equivalent to a prior authorizationhad never bern
departed from in any jurisdiction,in a material wayuntll
it became the subject of judicial scrutiny in the case
of Dodge vs.Hopkins 14 Wis.630. This case holds that
this rule applies only to the liability of the principal
as to the other partythat this liability is not mutual
until some act has beeii done by the other party which
expressly or impliedly gives assent to the principal's
ratification. Under the rule,thus modifiedwe have
the following situation. In the first placethe unauth-
orized agent so far as his principal is conuerned,is en-
tirely eliminated from the transaction by the subsequent
ratification, and the liability as to the other party
immediately attaches to the principal ratifying. It
seems to me that by ratifying the unauthorized act of
the agent,the principal,by this modified doctrine,simply
renews the offer or acceptance made in the first in-
stance by the agent unauthorized. This doctrine says)
that if there was no enforcible liability against the
other party before,there certainly is'nt after ratifica-
tion,for the other party took no part whatever in the
ratification. That was simply a transaction between
the unauthorized agent and his principal. Thereforethe
other party at the time of the ratification, is for the
first time in the history of the transaction placed in a
position to make or accept an offer coming from the
other sidewhich would be binding upon him. In otzier
wordsthe ratification by the principalis equivalent
to that part of the transaction whiich would have come
from him in the first instance,had he originally proceed-
ed in the place of th. agent. It is obvious therefore,
that the otzer party could not Oe bound until he had
made the transaction complete by doing his part. This he
may doby making any move which might be looked upon as
affirming what he had already done when dealing with the
unauthorized agent,as expressly affirming the ratifica-
tionor by beginning an action against the principal
to enforce the contract after ratification. But in no
case could the principal proceed against the other
party until after he lad in some way affirmed or as-
sented to such ratification.
Mr.Mechem in his work on Agency sec.179,is the first
text-book writer who takes notice of this interesting,
new and important bit of judicial legislation. He
there gives it careful attention)and after an elaborate
argument,adopts it as sound law) citing principally
Dodge vs.Hopkinssupra, Altee vs.Bartholomew 69 Wis.43
arnl Townsend vs..Corning 23 Wend. (N.Y.) 435, to support the
proposition. However, it is very doubtful as to whether
the New York case can be cited as an authority. True,
certain favorable inferences may be drawn from it as
to the doctrine under discussionbut nothing directly in
pointand it is to be doubted whether the distinguished
judge writing the opinion in the New York case ever had
such a doctrine in mind. Certainly nothing to indicate
such. a fact appears in any of the later decisions.
There can be no doubt however,as to the state of the law
in Wisconsin. The two Wisconsin cases above cited,are
decisive as to that. It will be noted, that the judges
in the Wisconsin cases and Mr.Mechem in his text-book,
give as the reason why the other party is not bound by
the principal's ratification,that such other party has
not affirmed or assented to the ratification; in other
wordsthat no assent has been given to the principal's
placing himself in the shoes of the unauthorized agent.
But it seems to me as rmy reasoning on this point will
showsupra,that the true reason is to be found in the
fact)that the ratification of the principal is nothiing
more or less than a renewal of the offer or acceptance
as the case may bemade in the first instanceby the
agentanri which before the ratification was invalid
as to the other partyjprovided he wished to treat it so.
If this be truein order to make the contract a binding
onethe other party must accept the offer thus renewed,
or if he is the party making the offerit is for him to
withdraw such offerbefore the principal ratifies his
agent's unauthorized acceptane, otlerwise he is bound.
Either course of reasoning brings about the same result,
but I submit that the above is the more logical.
(1) The other case illustrating how judges legislate
by overruling modifying or creating new precedentsis
the case of Seymour vs.Sturgis 26 N.Y.97. In this case,
it was held that the liability of a stockholder to a
corporationdoes not arise out of his relation to the
corporationbut depends upon his contract express or
impliedor upon some statute. As between the
stockholders and the corporationthis is no doubta cor-
rect exposition of what the law is and should bebut the
law as laid down in this case goes a step furtherand
decrees rthat a creditor of the corporation holds no
different relation to the shareholder than tnat held
by the corporation itself. That a creditor of the
corporation suing such stockholderwho holds shares for
which he has paid nothing, in order to enforce payment
from the shareholder of the face value of the shares so
held,must show that the corporation itself could enforce
such payment. This decision ,in cases of gratuitous
holders of stock in a corporation, entirely abrogates in
the State of New York,the well settled proposition, that
Othe capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for
the benefit of creditors! As the law now stands in this
state,a corporation is at liberty to distribute its
stock gratuitously, in whatever quantities and to whomso-
ever it pleases,regardless of the rights of creditors;
and such shares are no part of the cormmon trust fund.
Substantially the same question came up again in
the case of Christienson vs.Eno 106 N.Y.97 where the
following proposition was laid down. "At coranon law)
one to whom shares have been transferred gratuitously
by a corporation,does not by accepting them become a.
debtor to the company or make himself liable to pay the
nominal face of the shares and an action is not maintain-
able against him by a creditor of the company to compel
hi-, to pay for such shares. " Thus the Seymour vs.
Sturgis decision was affirmed.
Here the opportunity was offered to the judges of
our Court of Appeals to strangle the heresy introduced
by the Seymour v.Sturgis case into our lawbut they
lacked courage. Another decision was added by them
to its supportand they broke with all principles of
public policy and equity for the sake of being consis-
tent.
III
THE FIELD OCCUPIED BY THE JUDICIARY
IN LEGISLATION.
A. Rules to be followed by the judiciary in the
course of its legislation.
(a) "It may be fairly and legitimately claimed," says one
writer on this subject,"that where~changing the rules of
common lawas established by decided cases,new rules of
property would be introduced and vested rights disturbed,
the policy of the law would be against such change." It
would seem that this rule should never be departed from
by our courtsit being the distinctive office of the
legislature to make changes of this sort effecting
probably the people of a whole country or state.
Again,the legislature alone ean make such change in
such a manner as would incur no disturbance of vested
interests. This usually is brought about by inserting
into the ena,tment making such changea proviso that the
law thus altered should not affect rights already vested.
TIis the courts would be unable to do.
(b) Another rule isthat judges grappling with ques-
tions as to which they are in doubt concerning the cor-
rect rule to apply,should by no means be above yielding
to the influence of solemn decisions of well considered
cases;anl that such doubtful questions should find a so-
lution in the consultation of precedents. The wise and
However,
conservative spirit of tie law demands this. A but lit+,le
more than is contained in the above rules can be said in
behalf of the sacredness of precedents.
Judge Comstock in the case of Church vs.Brown 21
N.Y.335,in which case he expressly overrules Brewster
vs.Silence 4 Seld.207,and Draper vs.Snow 20 N.Y.33T,de-
clares that the following doctrine should commend itself
to both bench and bari "When the rules laid down by
the courts become the laws which sustain titles and con-
tractsthey are in general to be sacredly adhered to:
but when they are used only as instruments of destruction
error ceases to be sacred and principles of truth ought
to be re-asserted."
Barring those fundamental principles of abstract
justice upon which our law is foundedand which will
ever be reverenced and obeyed by manso long as he
possesses that power to distinguish between the just
am', that which is unjust,with which the Almighty has
endowed himjand the restraining rules above noted,the
doctrine of stare decisis should have no place as a re-
straining element in the development of the coiu'on law.
Aside from the considerations above mentioned it would
seem that the judiciary should be left free to act in
its own conservative way along legislative linesand
thattoo without censure.
The legislature is too slow too crude and inex-
perienced with the actual workings of society ever to
be able to originate law in the form of statutes that
apply adequately to the individual as his needs may
arise. Its time is too much taken up with numerous
other engagements to constantly revise the laws and
enact new measures for the protection of lifethe se-
curity of propertythe preservation of private rights,
and. the redress of private wrongs. As I have intimated
before the principal function of the legislature is to
enact general laws applicable to the whole cor.iunity;
and it cannot except in an imperfect way reach the needs
of the individual in his dealings with his neighbor.
Those dealings are constantly going on,the legislature
meets but twice each year, and while it is in session,
the general needs of the state places a heavy tax on its
time and attention. But the courts being in direct
touch with both parties of the transaction and being
able through its processes to reach both alikejnot only
can feel and know the grievances of each but can reach
out with its strong arm and administer the remedy.
And this remnedy generally speaking is administered on the
spotjwhile the matter is fresh in the minds of all par-
ties. Were this not the case)organized society would
be impossible; for it isafter allthe har::onious rela-
tions which exist between men in their every-day life,
that Lmakes a well oidered society possible. Order and
justice must go hand in hand or civilization is not.
The judiciary must thereforecreate the law to meet the
peculiar situations constantly arising in the intercourse
between individuals anc which cannot be provided for by
the legislature. It is in this way that a large propor-
tion of our law has been made up,that portion in par-
ticularthkt is most intimately connected with the rights
of lifeliberty and the pursuit of happiness. With
civilization progressing as it isand as I believe it
always mustwith unheard of and unthought of situations
constantly arising in every department 6f human en-
deavorthe conclusion comes irresistably homelthat
judge made law must ever keep pace with progressso long
as the elements of order and justice remain at the foun-
dation of societywhich is forever.
IV
THE NATURE OF JUDGE MADE LAW AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT.
The inquiry into the nature of judicial legislation
should first be prefaced by a definition as to how judge
made law is originated. Generally speaking it consists
of the rules drawn by the judges from the customs and
usages of the peoplewhich are crystalized by them into
substantive law in the form of decisions. The decision
then is the real and definite expression of the courts'
legislative functionand is an outgrowth of administerirg
justice itselfof applying the principles which reason
and policy demand to ever-varying circumstances. The
decision may be defined as the result of two somewhat
different ebains of analogies approaching a common point
by lines more or lecs inclined to be parallel. This
method of approach is by a contest at the bar;that con-
test is carried on by -the urging of these different
analogies~and as is well said by Paleyit is in the
comparison,adjustment and reconciliation of them with
one anotherin the discerning of such distinctionsar
in the forming of such determinationsas may either save
the various rules set up in the cause,or if that be im-
possible)may give up the weaker analogy to the stronger,
that the sagacity of the court is exercised in render-
ing the decision.' And when we have defined the decis-
ion we have also defined the machinery of judicial
legislationand we also have at least an insight into
the nature of judge made law. We may now turn to a
discussion of the development of some of the elements
that compose it.
All law is founded on customs and usages. Such
sweeping statements as Othe common law is judge made
law" "the coiumon law originated in the courts" are
therefore misleading and fail to tell the whole story.
As a matter of fact law and order in a primitive though
adequate formexisted among our savage and barbarous
ancestors long before the outlines of a judiciay had
*Moral Philosophy Vol II p.259.
been developed. This governing law was then, synony -
mous with public opinion and custom. It is a great
mistake to suppose that because away back before the
dawn of our civilization)our ancestors lived and died
without a system of police and judicial machinery to
maintain older and administer justice,that they lived
unrestrained at their own free will- Then as now, the
individual was selfish and too apt to look to his own
personal interests aixY those of his near friends,and to
disregard or wilfully to prejudice the good of his
neighbor and in consequence that of the whole community.
But public opinioi,as a rulethe expression of that
which constitutes the public good,of the interests of
the all over the one,enabled the assembled tribe in those
early timesyto crush the mean and cowardly with their
scorn and to give tne reward of glory to the generous
and broad spirited who exerted themselves for the good
of the all- Tris pres. ure of public opinion caused
men to act according to custom,which then was the law
of the land and which gave the rules as to what was to
be done and what was not to be donein most affairs of
life. And thus it was that custom law grew up and
became in no small sense the store-house from which the
judges constructed our common law. This result fol-
lowed very naturallyfor practically in every instance,
customs came into existence for the benefit of society -
or what was considered so,and in that way formed an
end-irinij basis upon which to build the complicated sys-
tem of laws characterizing our present civilization.
In no small sense is custom also the basis of statute
law,although considerations of present expediencywith-
out regard to what existed in the pastgcome in here
to dictate to a much larger extent. Public opinion
as expressed in custom and usage laid the foundation
for the development of the coimmon law and judicial
legislation developed it;and that along two distinct
lines - civil and criminal. The development of the
civil and criminal law may best be illustrated by tak-
ing these great departments up in their respective
order and treating by way of illustration. Two repre-
sentative exanples will be used for this purpose.
(a)The one used to illustrate the course of development
of civil law will be the doctrine of ultra vires as
applied to corporations. Here judicial legislation
plays a most important function in :2aking the existence
of the corporation possibleby aiding in the develop-
ment of an organization that the public would tolerate.
(b) Punishment in its severe and modified forms asa
characteristic in the history of crime will give us an
illustration as to the part judicial legislation took
in the development of the criminal law.
(1) The corporation as a creature of statute,is com-
paratively of recent origin. But away back in the
history of the English people we find the commrion lm
corporation constructed on common law principles and
existing mainly for municipal and religious purposes.
But as the industrial situation took on a more intense
aspect and the great commercial enterprises sprang into
greater prominence the proper soil was furnished in which
to extend the corporation to other and more general
purposes. At first,they were practically unhampered
by statutory restriction;but it soon became apparent as
they increased in numberswealth and importance,that
something must be done in the interests of the public
to confine their powers within narrower limits. This
result was brought about in part by statutory enactment)
in part by judicial legislation. By mutually comple-
menting each other~these two factors have brought down
to us from the shadowy past,the corporation in its
present perfect form. At the beginning of the period
of restriction ,statutes were enacted in the form of
general laws prohibiting corporations from exercising
certain enumerated powers. This was tne first method
of restraint. But industry and conuuerce continued to
expand,and rich and powerful corporations on account
of their utility in carrying on the gigantic manufactur-
ing and commercial enterprises that in the course of
time sprang upkept pace with them. The corporation
thus became such a comn-on and such a powerful factor in
the industrial world and the necessity to restrain be-
came so frequent and arose in such unexpected and diverse
ways,that the statutory System of restraintfirst re-
sorted to,wholly broke down and another method had to
be worked out. Let us be sure and understand the situa-
tion at this point. Let it be understood that in this
first period, corporations came into being under the
COmmon law and were restrained by statute. This method
of restraintas we have seen,proved a failure. By the
new method adopted,when this failure became apparent,
corporations were brought into existence as we have them
todaywholly by statutetheir power being limited and
prescribed by their charters or general incorporating
acts. Acts contrary to the restricting statutewhile
corporations were under the common law theory,were mala
prohibita,but acts by corporationsas statutory creationso
unauthorized by the creating charter or statute,were
called ultra vires. The creating statutewhetber it
be a charter or a general law,is simply an enabling act
and comprises the sole source of their power. Marshall
C.J.in referring to such creating statute in Head vs.
Ins.Co.2 Cranch 127 says "It enables them to contract ari
when it prescribes to them a mode of contracting they
must observe that mode,or the instrument no more creates
a contract than if the body had never been incorporated."
As a consequence of this change of base that the
corporation has undergonehas arisen as a product of
judicial legislationtthe doctrine of ultra vires.
That doctrine isthat whatever is unauthorized by the
real intent and spirit of the law creating the corpora-
tion,the courts hold to be impliedly prohibited by the
rule of statutory construction.
The doctrine of ultra viresabove outlinedfur-
nishes us one of the best examples of judicial legis-
lation. It was introduced into the law of corporations
as we have seen upon the strong grounds of public policy
and business necessity and to meet and provide for cir-
cumstances constantly arising which called for the in-
tervention of some strong handbut for which the legis-
lature had not and could not in the nature of the case
provide. This great doctrine is one of the many ex-
amples which might be taken from civil law going to show
that judicial legislation is not only a beneficent thing
but that it fills a place and performs a function that
the legislature could not hope to cope with,and that,be-
cause it is never on the spot as are the courts when
the thing transpiresto jot down all the circumstances
and then apply the remedy. A large part of our law
isand must bea natural product coming from actual ex-
perience gained by actual practice in the courts,by mi-
nute examination by the judges into new and undreamed of
situations~constantly arising in and growing out of our
great and co. .plex organization. No legislature composed
of meneducated in large part in the great sehool of
industrial and political competition~are capable or a-
dapted for adjusting equitably our social relations.
As I have intimated in a previous part of this discussion
the legislature is undoubtedly capable of dictating
general lines of action but it can never be in a posi-
tion to fill in the details which in fact compose the
greater and more important part of the law. The judges
before whom the actual cases are triedwho hear all the
evidence,who have complete control of the situation and
who are so guarded in the interests of the publicthat
partisan ,pecuniaryand personal prejudices are absent
to dictateare the only ones capable of performing this
function. The legislator) like a spectator on a high
eminence overlooking a valley below him,wherein a great
battle is raging,sees only the general lay of the fields
lying two or three miles below and wonders why such and
such movements are not directed against the enemy 's
position. But were he present on the fieldengaged in
the confllict,he would at o ice discover a masked battery
hereAn i:arassable ravine there before obscured and a
thousand and one other circumstances to !e taken into
h .v
consideration that he had not and could notA noticedbe-
fore. The courts being directly concerned in the con-
flict must of necessity apply the law and where new
situations arise abuses creep inby reason of defective
statutes law must be created or changedby some hook or
crook so as to remedy the case in hand.
This power of the courts to recognize and do away
with existing abuses cannot be better illustrated than
the way the courts have dealt with corporations on the
question of ultra vires. At the outsetultra vires
acts were considered in all cases to be absolutely void,
and the courts were confronted with a new situation of
grave importance. At first the hard and fast lines
of the law refused to give way to the necessities aris-
ing therefrom and to adapt themselves to the new con-
dition of affairs. Consequentlycorporations re-
veled for a time in the demoralizing but profitable
field of fraud and trickery. In tliat transition per-
iod,the time honored maxim of the coion lawwhich has
always meant salvation to the tricked and consternation
for the tricksternamely,"a man cannot stultify himself,"
was lost sight of and corporations were even allowed
to go to the extreme of putting in as a defense their
own incapacitywhen-ever it became inconvenient for
them to live up to their contract. Other fundamental
principles of law were brushed aside to that extentthat
corporations were allowed to keep the benefits of a
contract and yet refuse to perform its part of the agree-
ment. But this condition of affairs could not always
existfor the whole spirit of the law ever seeks out and
applies that which is just and equitable;and the result
wasthat the judges of the courts finally came out of
the woods of cowardly consistency where they had long-'
wandered in hopeless bewilderment, into the open day.
They had at last found their bearings had struck a
solution of the whole problem, and that result was brought
about by judicial legislation. Not a new remedy by
any meansbut one which in some instances,it has taken
years to apply.
I can best illustrate my point by stating the
doctrine as it originally stood and then showing how the
courts met the situation arising therefrom. The
question of ultra vires from the nature of the corpora-
tion itselfjcan only arise where an outside party has
contracted with the corporation and proceedings are be-
gun to enforce performanceor to recover damages from
the party in default. The original proposition gov-
erni-g this class of cases may be stated as follows:
All ultra vires contracts being unlawful are void and
the defense of invalidity is available equally to both
parties to the contract. This proposition was sus-
taineO in the courts on the ground that the other party
presumptively had notice of the extent of the powers of
the corporation~and therefore,was estopped from claim-
ing a remedy. But Comstock C.J.,in Oneida Bank vs.
Ontario Bank 21 N.Y.490 - 5,by an admirable and coura-
geous use of the legislative power of the judiciary,
renders the above position untenable,by enunciating aa-
other new and controlling principle in the law of cor-
porationswhich is founded in equity and the public wel-
fare. Therefore it has come to stay. This new pro-
position can be best set forth by quoting the learned
Judge's own words; R There is no doubt" says the Judge
"a principle of the common lawthat illegal and pro-
hibited contracts are void without being so expressly
declared by any statute. But there is also another
principle equally well ascertained and more beneficial
in its results,that no party shall set up his own il-
legality or wrong to the prejudice of an innocent persoir
The above, is now the principle controlling in ac-
tions growing out of ultra vires acts. Its development,
to be sureis but a single example of how judicial legis-
lation has moulded, slowly at times3 but surelythe whole
body of our corporation law. I might -o on and illus-
trate in detail how by its aidthe danger to the public
arising from the corporate mode of doing business has
been reduced to the minimum,and at the same timehas
increased its utility as a machine well on toward its
maximum limit. Many examples might be given4for the
corporation had its origin in the coailon law and nearly
every principle which governs it today,has been reared
and fashioned through the wise discretion of the courts.
HoweverI have avoided the use of numerous examplesin
the belief that my point would be clearer madeby treat-
ing this single great example of judicial legislation
in the law of corporationswith some degree of complete-
ness;and my aim has been to snow by this discussion upon
the development of the doutrine of ultra vireshow public
opinion as expressed in custom and usage,which is but
another way of saying public necessityfinds expressLion
through the clarifying medium of the courtsand in that
way becomes a part of the organic law of the land.
(b) We now turn to discuss some of the phases,and
the part that Judicial legislation has played in the
development of the criminal law. The criminal law
though following statutory lines of development in the
main,yet has been very largely influenced and moulded
by judicial legislation. The law of evidencethe mode
of trial and to a degreethe punishaent meted out to the
criminal ,have been in a great degree fashioned by its
hand. Of course,this influence has extended down
through long centuries and to get an understanding of
its real formative resultsit will be necessary to ic4-
quire soi..ewhat into the origin and development of the
criminal law as a whole.
The criminal law even suore largely than our civil
law is of Geriianic origin. This fact is now generally
recognized by scholars. "There can be no doubt" says
P_4 in discussing this subject,"tnat the set-
tlers who crossed the German Ocean and gave the name of
England to Southern Britainbrought witn them certain
customs which with little mrodification, constituted for
many centuries the criminal law of tie country. And
from these customs a large portion of our modern law has
painfully emerged. " True some of the ideas and custour
running through the law as it exists todaymay be as-
cribed to Roman origin,yet the larger part is founded
on the Teutonic. As to what these customs were, we
are able to catch glimpses of them through the latin of
Tacitusother Roman historians and the political and
social organization brought by the early Teutonic con-
querors to the shores of Britain. In this way we can
also trace,without great di-rficulty,their simple but
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fundamental ideas of justice and rightand what concerns
us most,their crude but effective way of dealing out
justice. We find that with this people as with all
other peoples the idea of justice first had its re-
pository in the minds of the individualinstead of its
being formulated in statutes and precedents;and that the
application of that idea to circumstances calling for re-
medial actioncame through the personal activity of each
man. Then it wasthat force was lay. itself and not
behind the law as we now speak of it. "Eye for eye",
"tooth for tooth", "life for life" were as much maxims to
ue followedwi'ttnose wild trib.es as "equity is equality"
or that "equity presumes that to be done which ought to
be done" with us today. But a little laterwhen jus-
tice began to be tempered with mercy,we find the ex-
treme rigor of this rough code somewhat modified. The
"blood wite",or compensation in the form of property for
personal wrongsbegan to take the place of private re-
venge. Public opinion declared that every outrage
cormitted was comitted by all in blood relation to the
wrongdoerand as a consequence,they were held as a body,
responsible before the Moot or town meeting. This
meeting was the colmmon ground on which all the freeman
met for the combined purposes of police and government.
Here legislation and justice joined hands,and were repre-
sented by the same functionaries. Hereindeed,do we
find judicial legislation in its simplicity.
Coming down to later times we find these customs
crystalized in the form of precedents and statutes,and
the rude Moot or "tun" meeting for the purposes of which
it in early times existedsubdivided into the Executive,
Legislative and Judiciary. At this time, it isthat
judicial legislation for the first could make itself
distinctly felt. The Judiciarythen as now,had the
power to formulate rules by which evidence was admitted
or excluded regarding the imanner in which trials should
be conducted;and therefore,could in large part control
the fate of those tried by it. In England during the
Middle Ages and down into the Seventeenth Century the
judiciary seemed wholly devoid of human sympathy and
thereforelwhat legislative power it possessed~was thrown
in the wrong direction and no accused received fair and
impartial treatment. This could hardly be otherwise.
The atmosphere surrounding the courts could produce
nothing else. Shocking deeds of brutality had been
practiced continuously for centuries before the judges
by way of torture,to obtain confessions from witnesses
and accused alike. They were also accustomed to sit at
trials by ordeal,compurgations and at judicial duels.
Hardened as they were to human sufferingthe practice
of the judges to gloat over the misfortunes of the ac-
cusedto inflict as much pain as possible before judgment
pronounced and to bawl out abusive epithets with blood-
thirsty exultationtbecame a characteristic of the judges
in the criminal courts. Macauley's description of
Judge Jeffreys will give a good idea of the character of
a criminal court judge of that period. "Impudence and
ferocity" says Macauleyusat upon his brow. The glare of
his eyes had a fascination for the unhappy victim on
whom they were fixed-yet his brow and eye were said to
be less terrible than the savage lines of his mouth.
His yell of fury,as was said by one who had often heard
it,sounded like the thunder of the judgment day. These
qualifications he carried while still a young man from
the bar to the bench. Already might be remarked in him
the most odious vice whicr is incident to human nature,
a delight in misery merely as misery. There was a
fiendish exultation in the -way in which he pronounced sen-
tence on offenders. Their weeping and imploring seem-
ed to titillate him voluptuously;and he loved to scare
them into fits by dilating with luxurious amplification
on all the details of what they were to suffer.'
Jeffrey was but one of his classand judicial
legislation in the keeping of such custodians massed it-
self in those times on the side of avarice and cruelty.
This is illustrated by reference to the famous Throck-
morton treason trial which occurred in the reign of
Mary. In this trial by the rules established by the
court itself the prisoner was not to be allowed counsel,
but was obliged to rely entirely upon his own wit and
tongue. Every expression used by him was turned
by the judges to his own disadvantage, if possible,and
in every good argument put forward by him he was in-
terrupted and sometimes silenced. When he raised a
point of law and asked the court to refer to certain
statutes for authority for his stateaenthe was told
that no books would be brought at his desire,and that the
judges knew the law well enough without such aid. Wfien
he criticised precedents quoted by the Attorney General
against himit was complained that he was allowed to talk
too muchand the Bench threatened in a vague way, cer-
tain consequences were he to continue. The judges in
this trial even hinting to the jury before their re-
tiringthat there was sufficient evidence to convict.
This is the first trial of which a complete report has
been preservedand it illustrates in a forciole way the
tendency of judicial legislation at that time in the
criminal law.
After the latter part of the Seventeenth Century
it appears that in England judicial legislationenforced
largely by a Christianized public opinionhad driven
torture almost entirely from tue courts. "Peine
forte et dure"was the only practice left and that was
practiced only at rare intervals. From this time
inhuman punishments grow less and less frequent and the
tone of the courts in inflicting punishment is more an
more human. On the continent the courts it seems,
passed through the same cycle of experience. Lieber
in his book on Free Goverrment p.218,says in speaking of
self-development of the law through the courts: ' In
countries in which this important principle is not
acknowledged,certain changes produced by"practice" were
and are nevertheless winked at,and happily so,because
legislation has neglected to make the necessary changes,
and humanity will not be outraged. Thus,in German
countriespractice (judicial legislation) had abolished
the torture and fearful punishments demanded by positive
law long before they were abolished by law." This
change to bet+,er things,of course,came about slowly,as
does any great and radical change in any department of
the law. And the result wasthat accused persons
were given fair and impartial trials before their
peers,the strong arm of the legislative power which the
courts possessed was thrown about them by way of rules
of evidencemode of trial, discretion as to punish-
ments and rules of construction;and a protecting bulwark
of presumptions was constructed,all to bear on the side
Of humanity and justice. Back in the latter part of
the Sixteenth Century we first find the tendencies
drifting strongly in the right direction. Stephens,in
his History of Criie in England Vol Ip.,68, remarks:
"if the average number of executions in each county were
only twenty or a little more than one fourth of the
actual number of capital sentences in Devonshire in 159 8,
this would make eight hundred executions per year in the
forty English counties." Coke remarks as follows in
the concluding lines of his Third Institute on the
above situation: "What a lamentable case it is,to see so
many Christian men ai-i women strangled on that cursed
tree of the gallows3 insomuch as if in a large field a
man might see together all the Christians tnat,but one
year throughiout England come to that untimely and ig-
nominious death, if there were any spark of grace or
charity in him,it would make his heart to bleed for pity
and compassion.'
THE END.

